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This study used basic personal values to elucidate the motivational meanings of ‘left' and ‘right' political
orientations in 20 representative national samples from the European Social Survey (2002-3). It also
compared the importance of personal values and socio-demographic variables as determinants of
political orientation. Hypotheses drew on the different histories, prevailing culture, and socio-economic
level of 3 sets of countries—liberal, traditional and post-communist. As hypothesized, universalism and
benevolence values explained a left orientation in both liberal and traditional countries and conformity
and tradition values explained a right orientation; values had little explanatory power in post-communist
countries. Values predicted political orientation more strongly than socio-demographic variables in
liberal countries, more weakly in post-communist countries, and about equally in traditional countries.
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Abstract 
This study used basic personal values to elucidate the motivational meanings of ‘left’ and 
‘right’ political orientations in 20 representative national samples from the European Social 
Survey (2002-3). It also compared the importance of personal values and socio-demographic 
variables as determinants of political orientation. Hypotheses drew on the different histories, 
prevailing culture, and socio-economic level of 3 sets of countries—liberal, traditional and 
post-communist. As hypothesized, universalism and benevolence values explained a left 
orientation in both liberal and traditional countries and conformity and tradition values 
explained a right orientation; values had little explanatory power in post-communist 
countries. Values predicted political orientation more strongly than socio-demographic 
variables in liberal countries, more weakly in post-communist countries, and about equally in 
traditional countries.  
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Personal values appear increasingly central to political orientations (Caprara & 
Zimbardo, 2004; Feldman, 1988; Franklin, Mackie & Valen, 1992). People use personal 
values to organize and prioritize their beliefs and feelings regarding political issues, to make 
and justify political decisions, and to communicate about politics (Caprara, et al., 2006; 
Feldman, 2003; Schwartz, Caprara, & Vecchione, 2010; Sniderman, Brody & Tetlock, 1991). 
Numerous scholars see values as the building blocks or principles underlying political 
ideologies (e.g., Converse, 1964; Feldman, 1988; Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz et al., 2010). Jost 
et al. (2003) presented a social cognition framework that draws on psychological needs, 
expressed in values, to account for differences in political orientation.  
The current study examines the role of basic personal values in left-right political 
orientations. It analyzes data from 20 countries that participated in the first round of the 
European Social Survey (ESS). We address two aspects of the role of values. First, we use 
people’s basic value priorities to shed light on variation in the motivational meaning of the 
left-right political dimension across countries. This dimension has been used to summarize 
political agendas in countries around the world, but its meanings may vary across countries 
and political contexts (Greenberg & Jonas, 2003; Huber & Inglehart, 1995; Knutsen, 1998; 
Thorisdottir et al., 2007). Relations of left and right orientations to people’s value priorities 
can reveal the motivational meaning of the left-right dimension. 
Second, we assess the relative importance of basic personal values and of socio-
demographic variables as determinants of left-right political orientation. Some scholars 
suggest that values have replaced social structural position and group loyalties as the critical 
determinants of voting behavior (Caprara & Zimbardo, 2004; Caprara et al., 2006; Schwartz, 
et al., 2010). They found that personal values accounted for more variance in voting and 
voting intentions in Italy and the USA than socio-demographic variables did. We test the 
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hypotheses that personal values account for more variance than socio-demographic variables 
in left-right political orientation in specifiable European countries but not in others. 
Basic Personal Values 
Studies in political science and political psychology typically refer to core political 
values (e.g., egalitarianism, civil liberties, limited government) that underlie specific 
attitudes, preferences, and evaluations in the sphere of politics (e.g., Feldman, 1988). Such 
values relate to particular political contexts. Schwartz, et al. (2010) suggest that these values 
express, in the political domain, more basic personal values that guide people in all domains 
of life. This study adopts the Schwartz (1992, 2006b) approach to basic personal values that 
specifies a set of values presumed to cover the full range of human motivations. The values 
identified in this approach can be applied across different political and historical contexts 
because they have been shown to apply across many cultures.  
A growing consensus defines basic values as cognitive representations of desirable, 
trans-situational goals, varying in importance, that serve as guiding principles in the life of a 
person or group (Schwartz, 1992, 2006b). People use values as standards to decide whether 
actions, events, or people are good or bad. As beliefs about what is desirable, they elicit 
positive or negative feelings when they are activated and pursued or defended. The Schwartz 
(1992) value theory identifies the following ten broad personal values, each defined in terms 
of the distinct motivational goals that it expresses. 
Power: social status and prestige, control or dominance over people and resources. 
Achievement: personal success through demonstrating competence according to social 
standards.  
Hedonism: pleasure and sensuous gratification for oneself. 
Stimulation: excitement, novelty, and challenge in life.  
Self-direction: independent thought and action—choosing, creating, exploring.  
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Universalism: understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and protection for the welfare of 
all people and for nature.  
Benevolence: preservation and enhancement of the welfare of people with whom one 
is in frequent personal contact.  
Tradition: respect, commitment and acceptance of the customs and ideas that 
traditional culture or religion provide the self.  
Conformity: restraint of actions, inclinations, and impulses likely to upset or harm 
others and violate social expectations or norms. 
Security: safety, harmony, and stability of society, of relationships, and of self. 
The theory further specifies a structure of dynamic relations among the ten values. 
Figure 1 depicts this structure as a circular motivational continuum reflecting the conflict and 
compatibility among values. The closer any two values around the circle, the more 
compatible their motivations and therefore the more likely that the same action or attitude 
can express or attain both. The more distant any two values, the more conflicting their 
motivations and hence the less it is possible for the same action or attitude to express or 
attain both. This integrated structure of values means that any behavior or attitude that is 
congruent with one basic value (e.g., a right orientation with power) should also be congruent 
with the adjacent values in the circle (security and achievement) but in conflict with the 
opposing values (universalism, benevolence, and self-direction). Thus, the whole integrated 
structure of values relates systematically to other variables. 
Figure 1 about here 
As shown in Figure 1, the ten values are organized along two bipolar dimensions: (1) 
Self-enhancement values (power, achievement) that encourage and legitimize the pursuit of 
self-interest oppose self-transcendence values (universalism, benevolence) that emphasize 
concern for the welfare of others. (2) Openness values (self-direction, stimulation) that favor 
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change and encourage pursuit of new ideas and experiences oppose conservation values 
(security, tradition, conformity) that emphasize maintaining the status quo and avoiding 
threat. Hedonism values share elements of both openness and self-enhancement.  
The circular structure of values also reflects another dynamic organizing principle of 
relevance to political orientations (Schwartz, 2006b). The values in the bottom half of the 
circle (Figure 1) are based in the need to avoid or control anxiety and threat and to protect the 
self. Values on the bottom right emphasize avoiding conflict, unpredictability, and change by 
submitting to others’ expectations and passively accepting the status quo. Those on the 
bottom left emphasize overcoming possible sources of anxiety by gaining dominance or 
admiration. In contrast, values in the top half of the circle are relatively anxiety free, 
expressing growth and self-expansion. Those on the top right emphasize promoting the 
welfare of others. Those on the top left emphasize autonomous self-expression. 
Research in over seventy cultural groups has validated the motivationally distinct 
content of these ten values and the relations of conflict and compatibility among them 
(Schwartz, 1992, 2006b; Schwartz & Boehnke, 2004). These ten basic values are relatively 
comprehensive; they overlook no major, distinct values that are meaningful across societies 
(De Clercq, Fontaine, & Anseel, 2008; Schwartz, 2006b). Therefore, the theory offers a near-
universal system of values that provides a basis for cross-cultural comparison. Applying this 
theory reduces the risk of overlooking values that might be politically relevant in some 
contexts but not others.  
Conceptions of the Left-Right Political Orientation  
Theorists have sought a limited set of ideological dimensions to capture the apparent 
variety of political orientations. In doing so, they assume that parties and voters can be 
located along these dimensions and that their locations indicate their ideological positions, 
that is, their political orientation (Gunther & Kuan, 2007; Feldman, 2003; Huber & Inglehart, 
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1995; Knutsen, 1998). The most popular single-dimension model of political competition is 
the "left-right" or "liberal-conservative" dimension (e.g., Downs 1957; Jost, Nosek & 
Gosling, 2008; Lispet, 1960). This dimension is useful for understanding and organizing 
political information and for summarizing political programs (Fuchs & Klingeman, 1990). 
Despite its widespread popularity and long tradition, or perhaps because of it, the uses 
and meanings of the political left-right dimension are controversial. Historically, the right 
was associated with aristocracy and conservatism, whereas the left was associated with social 
reform and egalitarianism (Lipset, 1960; Lipset & Rokkan 1967). However, dramatic social 
and political changes of the past few decades, most notably the collapse of communism and 
the emergence of "new politics" issues, have challenged these traditional meanings (e.g., 
Kitschelt & Hellemans, 1990; Knutsen, 1995b). Huber and Inglehart (1995) concluded from a 
survey of 42 societies that the left-right dimension “can be found almost wherever political 
parties exist, but it is an amorphous vessel whose meaning varies in systematic ways with the 
underlying political and economic conditions" (p. 91).  
Liberal, Traditional, and Post-Communist Countries 
We postulate that both the meaning of the left-right dimension and the relative 
importance of personal values and of socio-demographics in accounting for stances on this 
dimension differ across three sets of countries in the ESS. These sets of countries differ in 
their political history and culture. We derive hypotheses regarding relations of values with 
political orientations from the distinctive characteristics of each of these sets of countries.  
Liberal Countries. Eleven countries share a political tradition of liberal democracy 
and welfare-state systems: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. These countries fit 
what Gunther and Kuan (2007) call the ‘West European Template’ that derived from two 
major revolutions, the French revolution and the industrial revolution. On the one hand, a right 
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political orientation emerged that defended the old regimes and sought to maintain the 
hierarchical social order (Gunther & Kuan, 2007; Jost, Nosek & Gosling, 2008; Lipset & 
Rokkan, 1967). On the other hand, a left political orientation emerged that emphasized 
equality among all human beings and concern for their welfare, leading to socialist parties 
and welfare-state systems (Bobbio, 1996, Giddens, 1998). 
Traditional Countries. Religion plays a pivotal role in political discourse in Greece, 
Ireland, Israel, Poland, Portugal, and Spain, countries with a substantial religiously involved 
public (Barnea & Schwartz, 1998; Huber & Inglehart, 1995; Kissane, 2003; Mavrogordates, 
2003). An ongoing political debate in these countries concerns the extent to which the state 
should be supportive of and intertwined with religious institutions or independent of the 
influence of institutionalized religion (i.e., church/state relations). The pro-religion position in 
the traditional countries is often associated with the nationalist, political right (Barnea & 
Schwartz, 1998; Manuel, 2002; Mavrogordates, 2003; Tworzecki, 2003).  
Post-Communist Countries. Four countries share the experience both of an extended 
period of imposed communist rule and of a subsequent collapse of the communist regime and 
an opening to the West: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia.1 The swift opening 
of these countries to the West triggered a rise of strong traditional and right wing nationalist 
and religious sentiments (Markowski, 1997). In post-communist countries, however, 
preserving the traditional heritage can also mean protecting the communist social order that 
once represented the political left (Duriez, Van Hiel & Kossowska, 2005; Thorisdottir et al., 
2007; Zarycki, 2000). Not surprisingly, given this contradiction, research suggests that the 
left-right dimension lacks a clear, coherent meaning for many residents of these countries 
(Gunther & Kuan, 2003; Whitefield, 2002). In Poland, even party representatives sometimes 
reject the labels of 'left' and 'right' assigned to them (Zarycki, 2000). The likely confusion 
                                                 
1 Because both political contexts characterize Poland, we include it in both the traditional and post-communist 
sets. 
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regarding the meaning of “left-right” in these countries may yield weak associations with 
values that differ across post-communist countries.  
Values and Political Orientations  
A single dimension, such as left-right, may be insufficient to represent political 
competition (e.g., Rokeach, 1973). More popular are two-dimensional models. Studies across 
many countries have pointed to a socio-economic dimension concerned with the extent of 
economic equality among people and a liberalism dimension concerned with the extent of 
social change and individual rights and freedoms (e.g., Janda, 1980; Lipset & Rokkan, 1967). 
Schwartz (1994) suggested that these two dimensions parallel the two bipolar dimensions in 
his theory of values. A classical liberalism dimension, referring to issues of individual rights 
and civil liberties, parallels the openness to change versus conservation dimension of basic 
personal values. An economic egalitarianism dimension, referring to the distribution of 
resources and the degree of government intervention in the economy, parallels the self-
transcendence versus self-enhancement dimension of basic values. 
In linking basic values to positions on the two political dimensions, Schwartz and 
colleagues (Schwartz & Barnea, 1998, Schwartz, et al. 2010) assume that voters prefer 
policies and parties likely to facilitate the pursuit of the values they cherish and to defend 
these values against threat. Furthermore, voters reject policies and parties likely to threaten or 
frustrate attainment of their important values. Thus, people who give high priority to 
openness to change values should prefer policies perceived as likely to promote and protect 
individual freedoms and civil rights; people who give high priority to self-enhancement 
values should prefer non-egalitarian policies and parties that enable them to pursue their 
interests unfettered by government intervention and to retain the resources they accumulate. 
A study of values and party support in 14 countries supported this bi-dimensional 
approach to basic personal values and political competition. Barnea (2003) used the basic 
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values as discriminant variables in order to derive functions that discriminate among 
supporters of the political parties in each country. Almost all of the functions she derived in the 
14 countries could be categorized as reflecting one of the two major value dimensions. 
Another set of studies related basic personal values directly to voting. These studies identified 
the key values likely to predict voting for particular parties based on their policies in the 
electoral context of the country. For example, Caprara and colleagues (2006) hypothesized 
and found that voting for the center-left coalition in the 2001 Italian elections correlated 
positively with attributing high importance to universalism and benevolence values and low 
importance to security and power values.  
The above studies explored relations of values to bi-dimensional models of political 
competition and to voting. However, these studies did not relate values directly to people’s 
subjective assessment of their stance on the left-right dimension. We turn next to research on 
the left-right dimension per se.  
Little attention has been paid to the motivational bases of the left-right dimension. 
Building on the theoretical framework of Jost et al. (2003), Thorisdottir, et al. (2007) 
examined motivations that predict left-right political orientation in 19 countries from the first 
round of the European Social Survey (ESS). They selected 10 of the 21 ESS items intended 
to operationalize the ten Schwartz basic values (Schwartz, 2003). Thorisdottir et al. (2007) 
used these items to measure what they consider the two core aspects of a right orientation, 
traditionalism and acceptance of inequality. They measured traditionalism with one tradition 
item and acceptance of inequality with one universalism item. In addition, they used value 
items as proxies for three psychological needs that they hypothesized would predict a right 
orientation: needs for (a) order/rule-following (two conformity items), (b) security (two 
security items), and (c) openness to new experiences (two self-direction items and one 
stimulation item).  
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Thorisdottir et al. (2007) tested their hypotheses with correlations among manifest 
variables. Both traditionalism and acceptance of inequality predicted a right political 
orientation in West European countries and traditionalism predicted a right orientation in East 
European countries. Rule-following predicted a right orientation, more strongly in Western 
rather than Eastern Europe. Need for security predicted a right orientation in Western Europe 
but a left orientation in Eastern Europe. Conversely, openness to experience predicted a left 
orientation in Western Europe and a right orientation in Eastern Europe.  
Thorisdottir et al. (2007) did not assess whether the specific items they chose to 
operationalize their conceptual variables had equivalent meanings across countries. To the 
extent that the item meanings varied, comparing their relations with left-right orientations 
across countries cannot yield unambiguous conclusions. The current study, using the same 
database with the addition of one country, differs in two critical ways.   
First, we build upon the theory of 10 basic values that the ESS PVQ-21 was 
specifically designed to measure. We use all of the items and operationalize all of the basic 
values. The value theory provides a unified, near-universal framework of human motivations 
that is broader in scope and more comprehensive than the constructs used by Thorisdottir, et 
al. (2007). Past research that has validated the value theory in over 70 countries makes it 
particularly suitable for cross-national comparisons.2 Second, we control measurement error 
in the values and assess their cross-national equivalence of measurement by using the sets of 
items that index each value rather than single items from the PVQ. Controlling measurement 
errors and insuring cross-national equivalence of the values are crucial for obtaining accurate 
estimates of relations to left-right orientations and identifying true cross-national differences. 
Personal Values versus Socio-Demographic Variables  
                                                 
2 Bilsky, Janek, and Schwartz (in press) show that the structure of relations among the ten values is highly 
consistent across countries in the ESS. 
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Traditionally, political sociologists viewed social structural variables, particularly the 
social class cleavage that emerged following the industrial revolution, as the main 
determinant of political orientation. This view held that voters tend to choose parties that 
promote their class interests (e.g., Evans, 2000; Lipset & Rokkan, 1967). The assumption that 
working-class voters support parties of the political left whereas middle-class voters support 
parties of the political right was a basic axiom in political sociology (e.g., Alford, 1967; 
Franklin, et al., 1992; Lipset, 1960). Social structural variables such as occupation, levels of 
income and education, and membership in trade unions were used to capture "social class”. 
All of these variables were politically relevant, although their effects varied across countries.   
As politics has grown increasingly concerned with issues that cut across traditional 
cleavage lines such as the environment, gender, and minority rights, the idea of class voting 
has been challenged (e.g., Clark, Lipset & Rempel, 1993; Franklin, et al., 1992; Inglehart, 
1990). The linkage between voting and social structure is evidently declining (reviewed in 
Evans, 2000 and Manza et al., 1995). This decline exhibits a generational effect: Younger 
voters show more independence from group loyalties and have more instrumental and 
individual orientations towards politics (Franklin et al., 1992; Inglehart, 1997).  
With the individualization of politics, values may replace class and other group 
interests as critical bases of political orientations (Caprara & Zimbardo, 2004). In both the 
2001 and 2006 Italian national elections, values accounted for substantially more variance in 
voting than socio-demographic variables did (Caprara et al. 2006; Schwartz, et al. 2010). 
Thorisdottir et al. (2007) assessed effects of socio-demographic variables on the right-
orientation, but they did not compare their importance to that of the value-based variables. 
Research Questions and Hypotheses  
The current study addresses the following questions: What are the motivational bases 
of self-placement on the left-right political dimension as revealed by associations with value 
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priorities? How do these motivational bases vary across sets of countries, if at all? What is 
the relative importance of personal values versus socio-demographic characteristics in 
determining political orientation in different countries?  
H1. Conservation (tradition, conformity, security) and power values predict a right 
orientation in the liberal countries, whereas universalism and to a lesser extent benevolence 
values predict a left orientation. As noted, the political right that emerged following the major 
revolutions in the liberal countries emphasized defending the old regimes and preserving a 
hierarchical social order. These defensive aims express the motivations inherent in 
conservation and power values—to avoid change and control threats it may pose. The 
political left that emerged emphasized equality and concern for the welfare of citizens, aims 
motivated and justified by universalism and to some extent by benevolence values. 
H2. Conservation values predict a right orientation in the traditional countries, whereas self-
direction and universalism values predict a left orientation. Conservation values are closely 
tied to religiosity across countries (e.g., Schwartz & Huismans, 1995). These values can 
motivate and justify the emphasis of the right on giving institutionalized religion influence 
over the state. In contrast, self-direction and universalism values express motivations to grant 
individuals freedom to live as they prefer and to accept different life styles. These 
motivations are incompatible with having any particular institutionalized religion deeply 
involved in determining how life in society should be regulated.  
H3. Tradition values predict a right orientation in the post-communist countries. As noted, the 
right is associated with religious sentiments in these countries, hence the link to tradition 
values. But ‘left’ may be understood as representing communism on the one hand and 
Western liberalizing reforms on the other. Thus, the left-right dimension may lack a coherent 
or consistent motivational meaning in these countries. Consequently, we hypothesize no 
relations of political orientation to the other basic values in the post-communist countries. 
13 
 
  New politics theory argues that politics is more individualized in more economically 
advanced nations (Inglehart, 1997). In countries with service-based economies, a high degree 
of urbanization, and higher educational attainment, people are more likely to be capable of 
making political choices based on their own understandings and to be influenced less by their 
social location (Evans, 2000; Knutsen, 1997; Sniderman et al., 1991). Using 2002 GDP per 
capita to index socio-economic level, the 11 liberal countries and Ireland were the wealthiest, 
the post-communist countries the poorest, and the traditional countries in between. 
In culturally autonomous countries, individuals are encouraged to cultivate and express 
their unique preferences, ideas, and abilities (Schwartz, 2004, 2006a). In culturally embedded 
countries, individuals are encouraged to identify with the groups of which they are part, to 
pursue shared group goals, and to find meaning in life through their memberships. Thus, the 
more autonomous the culture, the more likely individuals are to rely on their own personal 
values in making political choices; the more embedded the culture, the more likely they are to 
respond in terms of group membership and social location. On the Schwartz (2004) indexes 
of cultural autonomy versus embeddedness, all the liberal countries are higher in autonomy 
than the traditional countries that are, in turn, higher than the post-communist countries. 
These differences among the three sets of countries in level of socio-economic development 
and prevailing cultural autonomy versus embeddedness underlie the following hypothesis. 
H4. Personal values explain more variance in political orientation than socio-demographic 
variables do in the liberal countries but less in the post-communist countries. We have no 
prediction for the traditional countries.  
Method 
Sample 
Strict probability samples of the resident population aged 15 years and older in each 
of 20 countries from round 1 of the European Social Survey (ESS, 2002-2003) participated in 
14 
 
this study (total N=35,116). We downloaded the data from website http://ess.nsd.uib.no. 
Table I lists the countries and their sample sizes.3  
Table I about here 
Measures 
Left-Right Political Orientation. Respondents were asked: In politics people 
sometimes talk of ‘left’ and ‘right’. Using this card, where would you place yourself on this 
scale, where 0 means the left and 10 means the right?  
Socio-demographic variables. We included five socio-demographic variables that have 
demonstrated relations to political orientation: Age (in years), gender (male 1, female 2), 
education (0 = not completed primary education; 1 = primary or first stage of basic; 2 = lower 
secondary or second stage of basic; 3 = upper secondary; 4 = post secondary, non-tertiary; 5 
= first stage of tertiary; 6 = second stage of tertiary), religiosity (scale from 0 – not at all 
religious to 10 – very religious), perceived adequacy of household income (1 = living 
comfortably on present income, 2 = coping on present income, 3 = finding it difficult on 
present income, 4 = finding it very difficult on present income) 4, and a dummy variable for 
being a member of a trade union currently or in the past (1 = yes, 0 = no). 
Values. The ESS includes 21 items to measure the 10 basic values (Schwartz, 2003). 
Two items measure each value, with three for universalism because of its broad content. Each 
gender-matched item presents a verbal portrait of a person in terms of his or her goals or 
aspirations that point implicitly to the importance of a value. For each portrait, respondents 
report how similar the person is to them using a 6pt Likert scale from 1 (very much like me) 
to 6 (not like me at all). Respondents’ own values are inferred from their self-reported 
                                                 
3 The Israeli sample included only Jews and not the Arab minority that constitutes almost 20% of the population. 
These two groups differ so greatly in the political domain that combining them would yield confusing findings. 
The small size of the Israeli Arab sample precluded treating it separately. 
4 Using household income would have required dropping at least 30% of the respondents in four countries and 
19% overall. Subjective adequacy of income was reported by 99% of respondents. It correlated .53 with 
household income. 
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similarity to people described implicitly in terms of their values. We reversed the scores so 
that higher scores signify greater importance. Table II lists the items and values they measure. 
Table II about here 
We tested for equivalence of meaning of the ten values across the 20 countries by 
assessing metric invariance (measurement equivalence).5  Metric invariance is necessary to 
insure that people understand the value scales similarly across countries and to justify cross-
group comparisons of construct correlates (Billiet, 2003; Steenkamp and Baumgartner, 1998; 
Vandenberg and Lance, 2000). Examined separately, each of the ten values exhibited metric 
invariance across countries. This justified interpreting associations of the individual values in 
each country in the same way. However, for analyzing all ten values together in one model, it 
was necessary to combine three pairs of adjacent values—tradition with conformity, power 
with achievement, and universalism with benevolence. As in previous studies (e.g., Davidov 
2008; Davidov, Schmidt & Schwartz, 2008),these adjacent values correlated too highly. 
Analyses  
First, to reveal the motivational meaning of left and right in each country, we 
computed covariances between each of the ten values and left-right self-placement. We did 
this by performing a multiple-group confirmatory factor analysis (Jöreskog, 1971) for each 
value. This estimated the covariance between the values and political orientation in each 
country simultaneously, controlling for measurement error and for metric invariance (Billiet, 
2003b; Steenkamp and Baumgartner, 1998; Vandenberg and Lance, 2000). 
Second, we computed several multiple-group structural equation models (Bollen 
1989; Jöreskog, 1971) to delineate relations of values to political orientation. We computed 
one model for the liberal countries, one for the traditional countries, and separate equations 
for each post-communist country. The latter enabled us to examine possible variation in the 
                                                 
5 All analyses were conducted with the program Amos 16.0 (Arbuckle 2005). 
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meaning of left-right in the post-communist countries. These analyses permitted us to 
estimate differences and similarities in the relations of values to political orientation across 
countries. Finally, to assess the relative importance of personal values versus socio-
demographic variables, we regressed political orientation on a separate block of age, gender, 
religiosity, education, perceived household income, and trade union membership.  
Results 
Table I reports country means and standard deviations for the left-right scale. With the 
exception of Israel, country means were all within one point of the scale midpoint (5.0). A 
post-hoc Scheffe test following a significant one-way ANOVA (p < .01) indicated that any 
difference between means larger than .3 was significant. The largest standard deviation 
(Israel) was only about 1.5 times the size of the smallest (UK). Hence, country differences in 
variance on the left-right scale are unlikely to account for the relative magnitude of the 
covariances between left-right orientation and values across countries. Even the smallest 
variance was sufficient to allow meaningful correlations between the scale and the 10 values.  
Motivational Bases of Self-Placement on the Left-Right Political Orientation Scale  
In order to test the hypotheses about variation in the motivational bases of political 
orientation, we compared relations of value priorities to left-right self-placement across 
countries. We used covariances (unstandardized correlations) rather than correlations because 
country differences in the standard deviations of values and political orientation do not affect 
covariances. Table III presents the covariances between each of the ten values and left-right 
self-placement in each country. The top panel groups the liberal set of countries, the middle 
panel the traditional set, and the bottom panel the post-communist set. The last rows of each 
panel summarize the observed associations for countries in the set.  
As hypothesized for the liberal countries, right self-placement covaried consistently 
negatively with universalism values and consistently positively with conformity, power, and 
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tradition values. Though less consistent, the expected positive association with security 
values was present in 8/11 countries. Overall, a right versus a left political orientation in the 
liberal countries expressed an emphasis on conservation and self-enhancement values at the 
expense of self-transcendence values.  
As hypothesized for the traditional countries, right self-placement covaried most 
consistently positively with tradition and conformity values. Although security values also 
covaried positively with right self-placement in some countries, its relations were generally 
weaker than in the liberal countries. In 4/6 countries, universalism and self-direction values 
covaried negatively with right self-placement, as hypothesized. However, universalism 
played a much smaller role as a motivator of political orientation in the traditional than in the 
liberal countries. Overall, in the traditional countries, a right versus left political orientation 
largely expressed conservation values, perhaps at the expense of the intellectual openness that 
is inherent in self-direction and universalism values.  
In the post-communist countries, right self-placement covaried positively though not 
strongly with tradition values in three of four countries. As hypothesized, however, there 
were no strong and consistent patterns of association between value priorities and political 
orientation. The Czech Republic exhibited a pattern unique among the 20 countries. A right 
orientation was associated with the openness to change values and a left orientation with 
security and conformity values.  
Table III about here 
Effects of Values and Socio-Demographic Characteristics on Political Orientation  
The above findings identify relations of the ten motivationally distinct values to left-
right self-placement in each country. They do not indicate the importance of the whole set of 
values as potential determinants of political orientation. Nor do they indicate the relative 
importance of values and socio-demographic variables in determining  political orientations. 
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To assess the overall importance of values, we analyzed structural equation models 
that regressed political orientation simultaneously on those values that had displayed the 
strongest relations with left-right placement. Because these values differed for the three sets 
of countries, we analyzed a different structural model for each set. The models included the 
relevant single or unified values that had exhibited metric invariance across countries in the 
simultaneous analysis of the invariance of all the values reported in the methods section.  
For the liberal countries, we included two unified values, universalism/benevolence 
and conformity/tradition, as well as the single values power and stimulation. Although 
security displayed quite consistent relations with left-right placement, we excluded it because 
its high correlation with conformity/tradition value produced multicolinearity. This resulted 
in little loss of explained variance. For the traditional countries we included the unified 
values conformity/tradition and universalism/benevolence that had the most consistent and 
powerful associations with political orientation. We excluded security and self-direction that 
also related to political orientation in some countries because including them produced severe 
multicollinearity. Their exclusion produced little loss of explained variance.  
Finally, for the post-communist countries, we included diverse values for each 
country as predictors. We chose this strategy because the post-communist countries showed 
no consistent pattern of associations between values and political orientation. For the Czech 
Republic, which showed the largest number of significant associations, we included the 
values achievement, hedonism, security, self-direction, stimulation, and the unified 
conformity/tradition value. For Hungary, we included the values hedonism, power and the 
unified value conformity/tradition. For Poland, we included only the unified 
conformity/tradition value, the one value that displayed some association with the political 
orientation variable in Poland. Finally, for Slovenia, we included as predictors the values 
hedonism, self-direction, and the unified  conformity/tradition value. These variables 
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displayed significant associations with political orientation in this country in the previous 
analyses. Although universalism also displayed a significant association with political 
orientation, we excluded it because its inclusion produced severe multicollinearity. This 
resulted in little loss of explained variance. 
Next, we analyzed a structural equation model that regressed political orientation 
simultaneously on six socio-demographic variables: age, gender, religiosity, education, 
perceived income adequacy, and trade union membership. We compared the total variance 
explained by the values model with the variance explained by the model that included only 
the socio-demographic variables. This comparison revealed the relative importance of the two 
types of variables. Finally, we analyzed a structural equation model that regressed political 
orientation simultaneously on both values and socio-demographic variables.  
Table IV summarizes the results for the three sets of countries. 6 For the 11 liberal 
countries (top panel), values alone accounted for an average of 11% of the variance in 
political orientation, from 6% in Belgium to 16% in Denmark. The socio-demographic 
variables alone accounted for an average of 6% of the variance in political orientation in the 
liberal countries. Values accounted for more variance than the socio-demographic variables 
in 10 of the 11 liberal countries and an equal amount in Finland. Including both values and 
socio-demographic variables simultaneously increased the average variance accounted for to 
14%. Religiosity was the most consistent socio-demographic predictor in the liberal 
countries, but its standardized effect size was smaller than that of values in all countries.  
Table IV about here 
For the six traditional countries (middle panel), values alone accounted for an average 
of 8% of the variance in political orientation, from 2% in Poland to 23% in Israel. The socio-
demographic variables alone accounted for an average of 10% of the variance in political 
                                                 
6 A table with the unstandardized regression coefficients and standard errors for each of the predictors of 
political orientation in each country for each of the three models is available from the authors. 
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orientation and accounted for more variance than values in four of the six countries. 
Including both values and socio-demographic variables simultaneously increased the average 
variance accounted for to 14%. As expected for countries in which religion plays a significant 
role in public life, religiosity was a stronger predictor than any single or unified value in five 
of the six countries (not Ireland). It was also consistently the strongest predictor among the 
socio-demographic variables.7 Thus, religiosity played a more important role as a predictor of 
political orientation in the traditional than in the liberal countries.  
For the four post-communist countries (third panel), values alone accounted for an 
average of only 4% of the variance in political orientation.8 As expected, values had a weaker 
effect on political orientation than in the liberal and traditional countries. Socio-demographic 
variables alone accounted for more variance than values did in every one of the post-
communist countries with the exception of the Czech Republic, averaging 7%. Including both 
values and socio-demographic variables simultaneously increased the average variance 
accounted for to 10%. Religiosity predicted a right orientation in all countries except for the 
Czech Republic and was the strongest predictor in Poland and Slovenia. In Hungary, age was 
the stronger predictor (with older people tending to the left). Only in the Czech Republic, did 
values predict political orientation better than socio-demographic variables did.  
In sum, as hypothesized, values predicted political orientation more strongly than 
socio-demographic variables in liberal countries but socio-demographic variables predicted 
more strongly in three of four post-communist countries. In traditional countries, both values 
and socio-demographic variables predicted significantly, but the latter were slightly stronger.  
Discussion 
Varied Meanings of Left-Right Self-Placement 
                                                 
7 Union membership was a slightly stronger predictor in Portugal. 
8 The variance explained by the unified conformity/tradition value in Poland was a little lower in this analysis 
than in the traditional countries analysis (.01 vs. .02) because this analysis excluded the unified  
universalism/benevolence value. If both conformity/tradition and universalism/benevolence are included, 
multicollinearity renders both insignificant. 
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We postulated that the meaning of left-right self-placement, as reflected in its relations 
to values, varies across the three sets of countries. In the liberal countries, as hypothesized, 
the covariance analyses revealed that a right orientation expressed tradition, power, 
conformity, and security values; a left orientation expressed universalism and, to a lesser 
extent, benevolence values. The findings identify motivations that underlie the political 
orientations. Avoiding change, controlling threats, and overcoming anxiety apparently 
motivate a right orientation; concern for the welfare of all others and the environment and 
equality motivate a left orientation. The conflict in European liberal democracies between 
supporters of conservation and maintenance of the hierarchical social order and supporters of 
welfare and equality reflect these motivations. The consistency of the pattern of covariances 
between values and political orientation across the liberal countries indicates that the meaning 
of the left-right dimension in these countries is coherent.   
For the traditional countries, we hypothesized that a right orientation expresses 
conservation values (tradition, conformity, and security). These values can motivate and 
justify giving institutionalized religion influence over the state and maintaining life styles 
compatible with religious norms. The covariance analyses supported this hypothesis for 
tradition values in all six countries and for both conformity and security values in most. We 
hypothesized that a left orientation expresses self-direction and universalism values. These 
values can motivate and justify opposition to the involvement of institutionalized religion in 
determining how life is regulated. The covariance analysis supported this hypothesis in four 
of the six countries. Stimulation values also covaried with a right orientation in Greece, 
Ireland, and Spain. This is compatible with the finding that stimulation values correlate 
strongly negatively with religiosity and support for traditional life styles in numerous 
countries (Schwartz, 2006b). 
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For the post-communist countries, we hypothesized associations with different values in 
each country and no clear overall pattern. As noted in the introduction, ‘left’ is sometimes 
linked to Western liberalism and sometimes to communism in these countries and these links 
may differ across countries. The covariances supported the hypothesis: Six values related 
significantly to left-right orientation in the Czech Republic and four of these values did so in 
Slovenia, but in the opposite direction. Moreover, a different set of three values related to 
political orientation in Hungary and only one value did so in Poland. Tradition values related 
significantly to a right orientation in three of four countries and no other value exhibited 
consistent covariances. This suggests that in post-communist countries the 'left' and 'right' 
political labels have little coherent meaning. Post-communist countries have yet to develop a 
common understanding of the left-right dimension.  
The covariances between values and political orientations in Poland fit the pattern for 
the post-communist rather than the traditional countries, despite the centrality of religion in 
Polish society. The church’s active involvement in the struggle against the communist regime 
may have confounded the usual pattern of countries where religion is central to society. The 
church’s activism conflicted with conservation values that oppose change and actions that 
generate uncertainty; it was compatible with openness to change and universalism values. 
Still, as the institutionalized religion, the church retains some appeal to those who emphasize 
conservation rather than openness values. Perhaps due to this confusion, values provide no 
clear basis for a political orientation related to the role of institutionalized religion in Poland. 
 More generally, the experience of communism and the profound changes that followed 
its collapse has led to confusion about the meaning of the left-right dimension in the post-
communist countries. These countries may now be going through a transition period and may 
yet develop stronger and more coherent associations between values and political orientation. 
Some may become similar to the liberal countries, whereas others may take a distinctive 
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course of their own. The unique pattern of associations in the Czech Republic may reflect 
such a distinctive course. Research with a larger sample of post-communist countries should 
assess the possible emergence of clearer meanings of political left and right in these countries 
and the historical, cultural, and political factors that contribute to the meanings that emerge.  
Relative Importance of Values and Socio-Demographic Variables 
The fourth hypothesis concerned the relative importance, as determinants of political 
orientation, of values and socio-demographic variables. We hypothesized that values explain 
more variance than socio-demographic variables do in the liberal countries but less in the 
post-communist countries. We based this hypothesis on an analysis of the opportunities for 
individual independence in more economically advanced liberal countries and the greater 
cultural emphases on autonomy and cultivation of individual uniqueness in these countries 
compared with the greater cultural emphasis on identification with the groups in which one is 
embedded in the post-communist countries.  
The multi-group structural equation model analyses confirmed this hypothesis. In the 
liberal countries, values explained nearly twice as much variance in political orientation as 
socio-demographic variables did; in the post-communist countries values explained less than 
a third of the variance socio-demographic variables did with the exception of the Czech 
Republic. These results support our reasoning. Values and socio-demographic variables were 
almost equally important for determining political orientation in the traditional countries. 
These countries, except for Ireland, fall between the liberal and post-communist countries in 
terms both of economic development and cultural autonomy versus embeddedness.  
 We placed Ireland with the traditional countries due to the centrality of religion in its 
public discourse and its high proportion of observant individuals. However, the findings 
placed Ireland closer to the liberal countries: Values predicted political orientation 
substantially more strongly than socio-demographic variables did, and religiosity predicted 
24 
 
political orientation at a level similar to that of the liberal countries. Economically, Ireland 
actually belongs with the liberal countries, and culturally its autonomy score places it above 
the traditional and below the liberal countries. These national characteristics may explain 
why values in Ireland are considerably more important than socio-demographic variables for 
determining political orientation, despite the central role of religion.  
As noted, religiosity was the most consistent socio-demographic predictor of political 
orientation, predicting  right self-placement in 18 of the 20 countries. Religiosity predicted 
more weakly in the liberal countries, but it is striking that it contributed significantly in 10 of 
these 11 countries (except Denmark). Despite centuries of secularization, religiosity 
apparently still plays an important role in European politics. Like values and unlike the other 
socio-demographic variables examined here, religiosity is a subjective, psychological 
characteristic of individuals that can serve as a guiding principle in life. Therefore, the 
importance of religiosity in this study may not provide evidence for the continuing 
importance of social structural position as a determinant of political orientations.  
We attempted to separate the effects of the psychological versus the social structural 
importance of religion for political orientation in a follow-up analysis. We assessed the social 
structural aspect of religion with responses to the membership question, “do you belong to a 
particular religion or denomination”.  We regressed left-right self-placement on values and 
socio-economic variables, including both religiosity and membership.  Religiosity predicted 
significantly in 18 countries and was a stronger predictor than membership in a religion in 17 
countries. In contrast, membership predicted significantly in only nine of the 20 countries. 
Overall, the subjective aspect of religion (religiosity) was a substantially more important 
determinant of left-right self-placement than the structural aspect (membership). 
Limitations and Innovations 
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We note three methodological limitations of the current research. First, we measured 
the left-right dimension using only a single-item indicator. Although this is common practice, 
it would be advisable to develop multiple indicators of political orientation in order to allow 
more control of measurement error in this key variable.  
Second, using the ESS scale, we were obliged to unify some of the motivationally 
related (adjacent) values into less narrowly defined pairs for cross-country comparisons. The 
within-country analyses using all ten values revealed, however, that one component of the 
unified value pair (e.g., universalism) often related substantially more strongly and 
consistently to individuals’ political orientation than the other (e.g., benevolence). This fits 
theoretical expectations and suggests that important information is lost by unifying values.  
Third, multicolinearity between values included in the same predictive model required 
dropping some values (e.g., security) from some analyses. Interdependence among 
motivationally similar (adjacent) values is inherent in the values theory. Nonetheless, it 
would be desirable to develop a values scale that minimizes the empirical interdependence 
among the value indexes. Such a scale may make it possible to reduce or avoid both the need 
to unify distinct values and the need to omit values from analyses due to multicolinearity. 
The findings of the current study are compatible with those of an earlier study of left-
right self-placement (Thorisdottir et al., 2007) but go beyond it in several respects. By 
including ten values that are grounded in a well-established theory of values, we were able to 
provide a richer assessment of the meanings of the political orientations. Moreover, the 
values we used had demonstrated metric invariance across the 20 countries in the study. This 
is necessary to justify their use in comparing associations between values and political 
orientation across these countries and it permits control of measurement errors.  
This study also innovated in obtaining reliable estimates of the relative importance of 
values and socio-demographic variables as determinants of political orientation. To do so, it 
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used value indexes that showed the metric invariance necessary for the cross-national 
comparisons. Furthermore, we identified three rather than two sets of European countries 
(liberal, traditional, and post-communist) in which relations of values and socio-demographic 
variables to political orientation exhibited different patterns.  
Conclusion 
This study demonstrates that political ‘right’ and ‘left’ have coherent meanings in both 
liberal and traditional European countries but not in post-communist countries. In the liberal 
countries, the value correlates of a right orientation indicate that it is concerned with 
preventing or overcoming anxiety through avoiding change, preserving the status quo, and 
exercising control. A right orientation has similar meanings in the traditional countries, but 
without an emphasis on the active exercise of control linked to power values. The value 
correlates of a left orientation indicate that its primary focus in the liberal countries is on 
promoting the welfare and equality of all and protecting the environment. This meaning of 
‘left’ is also present in the traditional countries. However, in traditional countries, left also 
emphasizes individual autonomy and openness to change, emphases that people in the liberal 
countries may take more for granted.  
Basic personal values have indeed assumed a more important role than social structural 
position as determinants of political orientations in the liberal countries. If we view religiosity 
as a personal value, this is true for the traditional countries as well. In the post-communist 
countries, however, aside from religiosity, personal values have yet to demonstrate 
substantial effects on political orientations. 
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Table I. Sample sizes, means and standard deviations of self-placement on the left-right scale  
 
Country 
 
N 
Left-Right Scale 
Mean (Std Dev) 
Austria  2,142 4.65 (1.84) 
Belgium  1,740 4.81  (2.05) 
Czech Republic  1,192 5.45  (2.38) 
Denmark  1,438 5.55  (1.97) 
Finland  1,738 5.63  (2.01) 
France  1,265 4.71  (2.44) 
Germany  2,726 4.68 (1.83) 
Greece   2,273 5.72  (2.17) 
Hungary  1,476 4.94  (2.35) 
Ireland  1,742 5.38  (1.83) 
Israel Jews  1,993 6.14 (2.70) 
Netherlands  2,248 5.31  (2.05) 
Norway  1,793 5.24  (1.99) 
Poland  1,836 5.12  (2.36) 
Portugal  1,349 5.11  (2.20) 
Slovenia 1,273 4.70 (2.17) 
Spain  1,556 4.37  (2.02) 
Sweden  1,669 4.93  (2.38) 
Switzerland 1,957 4.86  (1.85) 
United Kingdom 1,710 5.20 (1.73) 
Total 35,116  
Note: Higher means indicate self-placement further to the right. 
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Table II. Items that measure the 10 values in the ESS Human Values Scale  
Value Items 
Self-Direction 
(SD) 
1. Thinking up new ideas and being creative is important to him. He likes 
to do things in his own original way.  
 11. It is important to him to make his own decisions about what he does. He 
likes to be free to plan and not depend on others.  
Universalism 
(UN) 
3. He thinks it is important that every person in the world be treated 
equally. He believes everyone should have equal opportunities in life.  
 8. It is important to him to listen to people who are different from him. 
Even when he disagrees with them, he still wants to understand them.  
 19. He strongly believes that people should care for nature. Looking after 
the environment is important to him.  
Benevolence 
(BE) 
12. It is very important to him to help the people around him. He wants to 
care for their well-being.  
18. It is important to him to be loyal to his friends. He wants to devote 
himself to people close to him. 
Tradition (TR) 9. It is important to him to be humble and modest. He tries not to draw 
attention to himself.  
 20. Tradition is important to him. He tries to follow the customs handed 
down by his religion or his family. 
Conformity 
(CO) 
7. He believes that people should do what they're told. He thinks people 
should follow rules at all times, even when no one is watching.  
 16. It is important to him always to behave properly. He wants to avoid 
doing anything people would say is wrong.  
Security (SEC) 5. It is important to him to live in secure surroundings. He avoids anything 
that might endanger his safety.  
 14. It is important to him that the government insures his safety against all 
threats. He wants the state to be strong so it can defend its citizens.  
Power (PO) 
 
2. It is important to him to be rich. He wants to have a lot of money and 
expensive things. 
17. It is important to him to get respect from others. He wants people to do 
what he says. 
Achievement 
(AC) 
4. It is important to him to show his abilities. He wants people to admire 
what he does. 
13. Being very successful is important to him. He hopes people will 
recognize his achievements. 
Hedonism 
(HE) 
10. Having a good time is important to him. He likes to “spoil” himself. 
21. He seeks every chance he can to have fun. It is important to him to do 
things that give him pleasure.  
Stimulation 
(ST) 
6. He likes surprises and is always looking for new things to do. He thinks 
it is important to do lots of different things in life. 
 15. He looks for adventures and likes to take risks. He wants to have an 
exciting life. 
 
Note: Items are numbered in the order they appear in the Human Values Scale.
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Table III. Significant covariances between value priorities and right self-placement  
 
Countries SE CO TR BE UN SD ST HE AC PO 
Liberal           
Austria .39 .47 .19 -.12 -.17 -.11 -.18 -.15 .06  
Belgium .29 .22   -.13     .21 
Denmark .14 .33 .11 -.21 -.33     .30 
Finland  .29 .15  -.19  -.10  .07 .27 
France .43 .44 .22  -.31  -.19 -.21  .32 
Germany .16 .17 .14 -.11 -.20     .10 
Netherlands .28 .34 .14 -.14 -.23 -.12 -.13  .04 .21 
Norway   .05 -.14 -.27   .12  .36 
Sweden -.17 .31 .07 -.31 -.27 .18   .21 .45 
Switzerland .30 .36 .15  -.17  -.13   .23 
United Kingdom .21 .32 .13  -.13     .24 
    Summary             
# Positive 8 10 10 0 0 1 0 1 4 10 
# Not Significant 2 1 1 5 0 8 6 8 7 1 
# Negative 1 0 0 6 11 2 5 2 0 0 
Traditional           
Greece  .19 .11  -.09 -.17 -.14   .16 
Ireland .16 .32 .10  -.11 -.13 -.21 -.14   
Israel (Jews) .36 .58 .56 .37 -.18 -.08  .16 .13 .19 
Poland   .10        
Portugal .15 .31 .13        
Spain .18 .33 .13  -.16 -.28 -.15 -.22   
   Summary           
# Positive 4 5 6 1 0 0 0 1 1 2 
# Not Significant 2 1 0 5 2 2 3 3 5 4 
# Negative 0 0 0 0 4 4 3 2 0 0 
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Table III. continued 
 
Countries SE CO TR BE UN SD ST HE AC PO 
Post-Communist           
Czech Republic -.25 -.22    .46 .32 .39 .16  
Hungary   .10     .16  .16 
Poland   .10        
Slovenia  .17 .13  -.12 -.15  -.22   
   Summary           
# Positive 0 1 3 0 0 1 1 2 1 1 
# Not Significant 3 2 1 4 3 2 3 1 3 3 
# Negative 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 
  
Note. Only covariances significant p<.05 are shown. For value abbreviations, see Table II. 
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Table IV. Variance in political orientation accounted for by values and socio-demographic 
variables based on multi-group structural equation models  
 Values Alone Socio-Demographics 
Alone 
Values and Socio-
Demographics 
Countries R2 R2  R2 
Liberal     
Austria .10 .06 .13 
Belgium .06 .04 .09 
Denmark .16 .02 .17 
Finland .09 .09 .17 
France .12 .11 .18 
Germany .08 .05 .10 
Netherlands .15 .05 .17 
Norway .09 .03 .11 
Sweden .10 .06 .15 
Switzerland .13 .08 .16 
United Kingdom .09 .04 .12 
Mean R2 .11 .06 .14 
Traditional    
Greece .07 .08 .10 
Ireland .09 .04 .11 
Israel (Jews) .23 .23 .32 
Poland .02 .04 .05 
Portugal .03 .07 .09 
Spain .06 .12 .14 
Mean R2 .08 .10 .14 
Post-Communist    
Czech Republic .12 .06 .14 
Hungary .01 .06 .08 
Poland .01 .04 .05 
Slovenia .02 .10 .11 
Mean R2 .04 .07 .10 
